Clyde R. Murray and Lawrence L. Pack v. Minnie W. Miller and Lee Miller et al : Brief of Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
Clyde R. Murray and Lawrence L. Pack v. Minnie
W. Miller and Lee Miller et al : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
George Stanley; J. Lambert Gibson;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Murray v. Miller, No. 7828 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1737
SEP 2 8 1953 
IN THE -{;~Rid~" &fft:{p&fr( ~t~ 
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STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE R. MURRAY and LAWRENCE L. 
PACK, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, 
MINNIE W. MILLER, Residuary Legatee 
of Lee Charles Miller, deceased, and LEE 
MILLER, Defendants,· 
and 
OLGA K. ROBERTS, Administratrix of the 
Estate of Floyd Roberts, deceased; JEANE 
ROBERTS LABRUM and MARJORIE 
ROBERTS-OBERHANSLEY, heirs at law 
of Harry Roberts, deceased, 
Defendants and Cross-Complainants,· 
and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political subdivi-
sion of the State of Utah; 
LAVINA S. ROBERTS, H. C. WORKMAN 
and THELMA WORKMAN, his wife; 
W. H. COLTHARP, 
STANOLIND OIL AND GAS COMPANY, 
a corporation, Cross-Defendants 
and 
VERLEN V. LABRUM, Administrator of 
the Estate of Harry Roberts, deceased, 
Applicant f~r Intervention 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE R. MURRAY and LAWRENCE L. 
PACK, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, 
MINNIE W. MILLER, Residuary Legatee 
of Lee Charles Miller, deceased, and LEE 
MILLER, 
and Defendants; . 
OLGA K. ROBERTS, Administratrix of the 
Estate of Floyd Roberts, ·deceased; JEANE 
ROBERTS LABRUM and MARJORI;E 
ROBERTS-OBERHANSLEY, heirs at law 
of Harry Roberts, deceased, 
Defendants and Cross-Complainants; 
and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a political subdivi-
sion of the State .of Utah; 
LAVINA S. ROBERTS, H. C. WORKMAN 
and THELMA WORKMAN, his wife; 
W. H. COLTHARP, 
STANOLIND OIL AND GAS COMPANY, 
a corporation, Cross-Defendants 
and 
VERLEN V. LABRUM, Administrator of 
the Estate of Harry Roberts, deceased, . 
Applicant for Intervention 
FACTS 
Case No. 
7828 
On and prior to t~e third day of September, 1936, Harry 
Roberts was the owner of certain lands situated in Duchesne 
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County, State of Utah, subject only to an auditor's tax deed 
to part of said lands, which tax deed was recorded in the 
off ice of the County Recorder of Duchesne County on May 2, 
1924. On the said third day of September, 1936, the said 
Harry Roberts died leaving surviving him his widow, Lavina 
S. Roberts and three children, Floyd Roberts, Jean Roberts 
Labrum and Marjorie Roberts Oberhansley. The estate of the 
said Harry Roberts was never probated. The taxes on said 
lands became delinquent and the said Lavina S. Roberts, 
widow of Harry Roberts, purchased the said property from 
Duchesne County and received an auditor's tax deed from 
Duchesne County on the 26th day of May, A. D. 1943, and 
had the said· deed recorded in the office of the County Re-
. corder of Duchesne. County on the 22nd day of June, 1943. 
The said Lavina S. Roberts entered into an escrow agreement 
on the 25th day of May, A.D. 1944 whereby said Lavina S. 
Roberts agreed to sell said property to H. C .. Workman and 
Lavina S. Roberts executed a deed to the said H. C. Workman, 
which deed was placed in . the said escrow and thereafter 
delivered to H. C. Workman and recorded on the 24th day 
. of April, 1946. That during the period of the escrow agree-
ment, H. C. Workman and. Thelma Workman, his wife, 
made, executed and delivered an · oil and gas lease covering 
said lands, which lease was recorded and thereafter assigned 
to the Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., which assignment was re-
corded. That on the 7th day of June, 1947, H. C. Workman 
and his wife conveyed to Lawrence L. Pack and Clyde R. 
Murray the property formerly belonging to Harry Roberts, 
subject to the lease then held by Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. 
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Clyde R. Murray and Lawrence L. Pack, the grantees of 
the last mentioned deed, commenced an action ·on the 11th 
day of .L-\ugust, 1947 against the heirs of Harry Roberts to 
quiet title to the said lands (pages 1 and 2 of the record) . 
Lavina S. Roberts, widow of the said Harry Roberts, defaulted. 
Floyd Roberts, Jeane Roberts Labrum and Marjorie Roberts 
Oberhansley ans\vered on the 17th day of November, 1947 
and cross-complained, asking that title be quieted in them and 
joined as cross-defendants, Duchesne County, Lavina S. Rob-
erts, H. C. Workman, Thelma Workman, W. H. Coltharp 
and Stanolind Oil and Gas Co.; the basis of said cross-com-
plaint being that the said Lavina S. Roberts and her children, 
the cross-complainants, as surviving heirs of Harry Roberts, 
became co-tenants of the land involved and that said cross-
complainants, the children of Harry Roberts, contributed to 
the purchase of the said tax title and that the said Lavina S. 
Roberts purchased and held· the title to said land as trustee 
for her fellow co-tenants. Cross-complainants further alleged 
that all of said facts were known to cross-defendants and re-
quested the court to determine that the cross-complainants 
were the owners of an undivided two-thirds interest to said 
property (pages 21 to 2 5 of the record) . 
On the 29th day of April, 1948 the Stanolind Oil and 
Gas Co. filed an answer whereby Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. 
alleged that the said oil and gas lease was a valid lease and 
further alleged ·that a stipulation. had been entered into be-
tween all the parties to the action ratifying said oil and gas 
lease and agreeing that any interest in the property would 
be subject to said oil and gas lease and requested that the 
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court in its final judgment determine to whom the Stanolind 
Oil and Gas Co. should make further payments. under said 
lease (pages 59-61 of the record). 
On the 17th day of May, 1948, Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. 
moved the court that the said Stanolind Oil and Gas Co. be 
directed and ordered to make further payments on the said 
lease into the court as provided_ in the said stipulation and that 
the court direct the payments of any money so deposited to 
the various parties as their interest appeared upon final judg-
ment. (Record-pages 66-67). On the said 17th day of May, 
the court entered such an order (Record page 68), and Stano-
lind Oil and Gas Co. has paid all subsequent payments into 
Court. On the -30th day of January, 1950, the original attorneys 
for the cross-complainants withdrew (Record page 87) and 
on the 2~st day of February, 1950, a petition was filed wherein 
th~ cross-complainants requeste~ that the said stipulation here-
tofore mentioned be set aside and declared null and void (Rec-
ord _pages 91-92) . 
On the 20th day of June, 1950, the plaintiffs answered the 
cross-complaint, denying that the said Lavina S. Roberts held 
title to the land as trustee for the cross-complainants and fur-
ther denying that they had any notice of any claim of the cross-
complainants to said lands. 
On the 26th day of January, 1951 the cross-defendants, 
H. C. Workman and Thelma Workman, his wife, filed their 
answer to the cross~compl~int, denying that ·Lavina S. Roberts 
had purchased the title to said lands as trustee for the cross-
complainants and denying that they had any knowledge of 
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any claim of the cross-complainants and affirmatively alleging 
that the cross-complainants were a\vare of the sale of said 
lands by their mother, Lavina S. Roberts to the cross-defend-
ant, H. C. Workman, and at no time asserted any right, title 
or interest to said premises, nor informed him that the said 
Lavina S. Roberts held the property in trust for them, but 
permitted him to buy the land without so notifying him, and 
plead that the statute of limitations for trusts had run. (Rec-
ord pages 116-123). Said matter was set for trial and came 
on for trial on the 4th day of September, 1951 under the 
pleadings as hereinbefore set forth. The plaintiffs, Murray 
and Pack, completed their evidence and the attorneys for 
the cross-complainants moved the court · to dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint (Transcript page 42) . The court permitted the 
plaintiffs to reopen and introduce additional evidence which 
they did. At the close of the additional evidence, cross-com-
plainants renewed their motion (Transcript page 50). Said 
motion was over-ruled (Transcript page 50). Plaintiff then 
moved to amend his complaint (Transcript page 51). Coun-
sel for the cross-complainants then requested twenty days in 
which to file their answer to the amended complaint, which 
was granted (Transcript page 52). On the 24th day of Sep-
tember, 1951, cross-complainants filed their amended answer 
and cross-complaint, wherein they alleged that at the date of 
the death of the said Harry Roberts all of his property passed 
to his heirs, the cros~-complainants, and that ever since said 
time the said heirs had been and then were the owners in fee 
simple of two-thirds of said property, (Record ____________ ). Stano-
lind Oil and Gas Co. filed a motion to dismiss the said amend-
ed cross-complaint on the ground that the said amended cross-
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complaint constituted a completely different and new cause of 
action. (Record page 142). 
H. C. Workman and Thelma Workman filed a motion to 
strike the amended answer and cross~complain.t on the 25th 
day of October, 1951 on the grounds that t~e amended cross-
complaint was a new and different cause of action which was 
repugnant to and at variance with the cause of action stated 
in the original cross-complaint. (Pages 143-144, Record) .. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. A NEW OR DIFFERENT CAUSE OF ACTION 
MAY NOT BE ALLEGED UNDER THE GUISE OF AM-
ENDMENT . 
. ·2. A COMPLAINANT IS NOT PERMITTED TO 
STATE BY AMENDMENT A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION 
UPON WHICH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS 
RUN. 
3. AMENDED CROSS COMPLAINT DOES NOT 
STATE A CLAIM ARISING OUT OF THE CONDUCT, 
TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE. SET FORTH IN THE 
ORIGINAL PLEADINGS. 
ARGUMENT 
1. A NEW OR DIFFERENT CAUSE OF ACTION 
MAY NOT BE ALLEGED UNDER THE GUISE OF AM-
ENDMENT. 
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Prior to the adoption of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the law in the State of Utah was well settled by this Court, 
as was stated in the case of Peterson vs. Union Pacific Railway, 
79 U. 213, 8 P.2d 627, in which the Court said, "It is well 
established, that a new or different cause of action may not 
be alleged under the guise of an amendment, 49 C.J. 507; 
Combined Metals, et al vs: Bastian, et al, 71 U. 535, 267 
P. 1020." To the same effect, see also the case of Sargeant vs. 
Union Fuel Company, 37 U. 3-92, 108 P. 928 and Grover .vs. 
Cash, 69 U. 294, 253 P. 676. 
2. A COMPLAINANT IS NOT PERMIT'fED TO 
STATE BY AMENDMENT A NEW CAUSE OF ACTION 
UPON WHICH THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS 
RUN. 
34 Am. Jur., page 211, paragraph 260, states the general 
law as follows: 
((The question whether an amendment to a pleading 
relates back to the bringing of the suit, for determin-
ing the application of the statute of limitations, de-
pends principally upon the nature of the matter asserted 
by the amendments,-whether ·the amendment states 
a new cause of action or merely restates in different 
form the cause of action stated in the original plead-
ing. An amendment to the plaintiffs' declaration, com-
plaint, or petition, so long as it does not introduce a 
new cause of action or make any new demancJ. or sub-
stantially change the cause of action, but merely re-
states in a different fonn the cause of action originally 
pleaded, relates back to the commencement of the ac-
tion so as to a void the operation of the statute of 
limitations, and may therefore be made even after 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the statute of. limitations has run. Under this rule, 
where an amendment to the plaintiff's pleading is 
proper! y allowed, so far as regards the statute of limi-
tations it will have the same effect as if his pleading 
had been properly filed in the amended form at the 
commencement of the sui~. Where, however, the 
amendment introduces a new cause of action or one 
which is different and distinct from that originally 
set up, the new pleading is deemed equivalent to the 
bringing of a new action, and there is no relation 
back to the filing of the original pleading which will 
prevent the statute of limitations from running against 
the new cause of action down to, the time that it is 
introduced byw the amendment. One cannot, under 
the pretext of amending his pleading, state a new 
or different cause of action from the one originally 
stated and thereby avqid the running of the statute of 
limitations. A (new cause of action,' within this rule, 
may refer to new facts out of which liability arises, or 
to new parties alleged to be entitled under the same 
facts, or it may embrace both. An amendment of 
pleadings which, under the decisions of a state, sets 
up a new cause of action is not effective in· a Federal 
court sitting in such state when made after tl;le limita-
tion period has run." 
An amendment, filed . after the expiration of the statute 
of limitations, and setting up additional and different claims, 
does not· relate back to the date of the· original pleading, and 
hence, additional claims are barred even under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See L. E. Whitman Construction Company vs. Re· 
mer, 105 Fed. 2, 371 (CCA lOth, 1939). 
An amended Compl~int cannot be held to relate back 
to the date of the original complaint if it sets forth new causes 
10 
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of action which \vould be barred by the statute of limitations, 
if a separate action were instituted thereon. 
See Ronald Press Co. v. Shea, 27 Fed. Supp. 857. 
In the case of the United States vs. MacEvoy, ~0 F.R.D. 
323, the court, discussing the Federal Rules, stated: 
( tW e concede that the most liberal construction of 
this Rule will not permit the introduction of additional 
claims which have been barred by the statute of limi-
tations.'' 
The Utah Rules were copied from the Federal Rules. 
And even supposing that the Rules amended or abolished 
the existing law in the State of Utah at the time of the adoption 
of the rules, such adoption does not permit cross-complainants 
to do as they seek to do in _the instant case. They would not 
. be permitted to do so under the Federal Rules and certainly 
should not be permitted to do so under the State Rules. 
In the case at bar, the cross defendants and their prede-
cessors and successors in interest had been in possession, under 
deed, from the 26th day of May, 1943, and under a claim of 
posse~sion openly, notoriously and adversely to everyone in 
the world. That the time in which to contest such possession 
expired on the 26th day of May, 1950, and that the. A~ended 
Cross Complaint was not filed until the 25th day of September, 
1951 and was barred by the s'tatute of limitations. 
3. AMENDED CROSS COMPLAINT DOES NOT 
STATE A CLAIM ARISING OUT OF THE CONDUCT, 
TRANSACTION OR OCCURRENCE SET FORTH IN THE 
ORIGINAL PLEADINGS. 
ll 
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In the original cross complaint, the occurrence complained 
of was the sale by Lavina S. Roberts to H. C. Workman with-
out protecting the claimed beneficial interests of the cross-
complainants. The tax title was pleaded in the original cross 
complaint as a valid title purchased by Mrs. Roberts, as Trustee 
for herself and children, and with monies furnished by the 
children. It was further alleged that the cross defendants had 
knowledge of said facts and held subject to the trust. The 
amended cross-com plaint abandons all pretense of a trust and 
in substance alleges that title. became vested in the cross com-
plainants in 1936 and was nev~r thereafter divested. It, -in 
substance, attacks the tax title and the procedure of Duchesne 
County in assessing and selling the property for taxes. This 
is a completely different occurrence and transaction from that 
objected to in the original cross complaint. 
34 Am. Jur. 214 states the general law as follows: 
((Various tests have been announced ~y which to 
determine whether the causes of action stated by 
original and amended pleadings are identical. One 
tests is to determine whether the same evidence would 
support a judgment rendered on either. Another test 
is whether a judgment under the one could be success-
fully pleaded as a former adjudication against the 
cause of action set out in the other. Still another test, 
said to be the true one, is to determine whether the 
matter set up in the amendment amounts to a departure 
in after pleading. It has been declared that an amend-
ment to a complaint, in order to come within the 
doctrine of relation back to the commencement of the 
suit, and to cut off the plea of the statute of limita-
tions, must be only a varying form or expression of the 
claim or cause of action sued on, and the subject 
12 
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matter of the amendn1ent must be wholly \V ithin the 
lis pendens of the original suit.,, ·* * * 
\{The rule that the application .of the statute of 
limitations as a bar to the right _to assert claims by 
\vay of amendment to pleadings, where the statutory 
time limit expired after the commencement of the ac-
tion of the filing of the original pleading, depends 
upon whether the amendment intends to set forth 
a new cause of action, or merely to restate and amplify 
the cause of action originally set forth, has been ap-
plied in a great variety of cases.'' 
An Annotation at 171 A.L.R. 1088 compiles the cases in-
volving this. theory as it relates to negligent cases. 
In Barnes vs. Boyd, 8 Fed. Supp., 584 at page 597, the 
court denied plaintiff's right to amend and stated: 
ctThe remedies sought are on widely different theo-
ries, are incongruous and contradictory. The theory of 
the original bill is that plaintiff has lost title to the land 
through judgm~nts obtained in ejectment suits, and 
seeks cancellation of these judgments on the ground 
they were obtained by fraud. The amended bills in-
volve the theory that plaintiff has legal title to the land 
and that some instrument or record is a ·cloud on 
the title of plaintiff and should be cleared away." 
In 3 Moore, Fed. Practice, 811, the author in commenting 
on this case states: 
((The theories are inconsistent since in the former 
the plaintiff alleges the defendant is in . title while 
in the latter he denies it." 
The problem in the case at bar is identical with that above. 
In the original cross-complaint, cross-complainants allege cross-
I ; 
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defendants to hold the legal title but subject to a trust in them, 
and in the amended cross-complaint allege that legal title is in 
cross-complainants. 
CONCLUSION 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure on 
an amendment alleging a new cause of action was vulnerable 
to a demurrer. The Utah rules were taken from the Federal 
Rules and even under the Federal Rules a person could not 
by amendment allege a new cause of action. upon which the 
Statute of Limitations 'had run. We therefore respectfully 
subm~t that the lower court erred in not striking the amended 
cross complain~. . 
GEORGE STANLEY 
Attorney for H. C. Workman and Thelma Workman 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON 
Attorne.y for Stanolind Oil and Gas Company 
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